Comments on Standards of Judicial Review by Van Alstyne, William W.
Nota editorial
Durante el afto acad6mico 1986-87, la Escuela de Derecho de la
Universidad de Puerto Rico auspici6 un Seminario en conmemoraci6n del
Bicentenario de la Constituci6n de Estados Unidos. En este seminario
participaron reconocidos estudiosos de Derecho Constitucional de Puerto
Rico, Estados Unidos y Espafia.
El primer ponente en'este seminario fue el Profesor William Van Alstyne,
Catedrdtico de Derecho Constitucional en Duke University, y tratadista de
reconocimiento internacional sobre el Derecho Constitucional
norteam6ricano. Desafortunadamente, por compromisos previos de
publicaci6n la ponencia del Profesor Van Alstyne no pudo ser publicada en
esta Revista Juridica. Sin embargo, nos interes6 publicar el Comentario que,
como reacci6n a la ponencia del Profesor Van Alstyne, hiciera en aquella
ocasi6n el Profesor Jos6 Julidn Alvarez Gonzdlez. El Profesor Alvarez ensefia
Derecho Constitucional en la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Puerto
Rico.
Al conocer la versi6n final para publicaci6n del Comentario del Profesor
Alvarez, el profesor Van Alstyne le pidi6 a la Revista Juridica que publicara
una carta que le habia enviado a 6ste el 18 de mayo de 1987. Esta carta presenta
unas criticas al articulo del profesor Alvarez. Este Ciltimo, a su vez, le pidi6 a la
Revista Juridica que publicara su contestaci6n del 1 dejunio al profesor Van
Alstyne.
La Revista Juridica ha accedido a publicar estas cartas, para presentar a
nuestros lectores algunas de las dimensiones del debate.
Junta Editora
1986-1987

Professor Jos6 Juliin Alvarez-Gonzilez
Escuela de Derecho
Universidad de Puerto Rico
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico
Dear Professor Alvarez:
My thanks for your courtesy in sending me your manuscript. And I do
appreciate your solicitation of my comments.
To be complete, I think you may want to consider (if not respond to) the
enclosed brief article manuscripts as well, since both do bear on, and round
out, the two selections of which your manuscript is quite critical. The first is a
finished version of the paper I shared in outline in Puerto Rco. Had it not been
previously promised to the Iowa Law School, I would have been pleased to
have finished it for your law review instead. As it is literally "Part II" to the
Illinois Law Review article, however, and was the occasion for my appearance
in Puerto Rico, it probably should be accounted for in your response. It will
appear this summer, as part of a symposium issue occasioned by the
dedication of the new University of Iowa Law Schol building.
The other, much shorter piece, will appear this next month in the Journal
of Legal Education. It is a finished form of a brief paper I presented at the
plenary session of the AALS in January, in Los Angeles, on "The Idea of the
Constitution as Hard Law". The four pieces, beginning with the University of
Florida piece, and carrying through these three, more or less complete what I
mean to say on the general subject of judicial review, standards, and the
Supreme Court. Together, I think they may state a general thesis somewhat
less vulnerable than your conscientious draft supposes. Part IV of the longer
paper should test you considerably.
On some minor matters, let me add a few minor points. First, history
obviously matters--if one had no idea even of the nature of the problem or
concern to which a clause in the Constitution were directed, one would have no
useful orientation in selecting among radically different (and even mutually
exclusive) applications of the clause. An excellent example is the first
amendment. If one were quite convinced that "the" freedom of speech and of
the press that solely accounted for the amendment was an objection solely to a
licensing system, and nothing more, then I suggest one would necessarily
concede that the Supreme Court would have falsified that amendment in
"reading" it as embracing some larger proposition--whether or not you and I
regretted the limited objective of the clause. Indeed, I take it for granted that
academic debate on the origins of the first amendment is passionate and
intense partly because all implicitly recognize that a great deal is at stake; that
the origins of the amendment are not merely of interest to antiquarians, but
that they count heavily with one, respecting the assessment of the Supreme
Court's own work (exactly in the same way critics are very fond of falsifying
Lochner, as Holmes did, by suggesting the Court "read" into the due process
clause its own economic agenda). The enclosed book review reprint provides
you with an example, concretely, of that particular history--and why, most of
all in light of that history, I believe a very strong view of the first amendment's
free speech and free press clause is entirely proper.
Second, Marshall is not a "noninterpretivist" by any plausible view,
although the matter does not bother me a great deal since, as you
acknowledge, the coiners of that ludicrous phrase have now abandoned it
from embarrassment. Marshall was, first of all, responsible for a general
presumption or rule of "generous construction", as I spell out in the enclosed
manuscript, and Marshall applied that rule with a fair degree of generality as
others have failed to do, e.g., he applied it to protect private commercial
interests under Article I, § 10, quite as much as he did re the enumerated
powers vested in Congress. But I do agree that Marshall also fudged--by
adding something which I also examine critically, once again, in the enclosed
manuscript. Neither he (nor you) offer any plausible reason why, once it is
conceded that the national government is one of enumerated powers only,
there is any reason (other than one of fudging) to relieve the party relying on an
act of Congress from the obligation of showing the foundations of its
authorization in the Constitution.
Similarly, at page 24, I think you may have misunderstood. I did indeed say
that the early decisions had more of the look and feel of constitutional law than
do equivalent decisions today. The point was not to contradict my misgivings
with some manipulations of judicial standards even during the Marshall Court
era, however, but a different point altogether. It was, rather, that because the
Court was still in its youth, it was not encumbered by past precedents of its
own in accounting for its work. Thus, it could more easily seem to be
proceeding coherently and consistently, simply from having less handicap in
having to "explain" and "distinguish" the accumulated precedents already
amassed under the clauses it applied and "interpreted". My point is that, over
time, that early advantage (which makes it easier to "write your own ticket")
isn't quite so easy or convincing. The debris of past decisions, other
manipulated standards of review, etc., confront the later court. Indeed, the
rank politicization of the judicial process becomes a much more obvious
phenomenon.
Additionally, as a scholarly matter, the "final" verdict on Brown, as well as
Roe is not now in; respectfully, your sense of moral certitude (so widely shared
by others) is altogether misplaced, even as Bickel (in his work on the Warren
Court and the Idea of Progress) came fully to appreciate. (In that book, Bickel
suggested, very critically, that the Warren Court, confident of its grasp of how
the future would "look back" on its decisions, decided cases according to that
confidence, wanting much more to be remembered as a "good" Court than any
other way; so it began to lay the actual Constitution aside, to nudge its own
preferred moral confidence into place.) My current article is partly an attempt
to lay bare the conflict, rather than the reconcilability, of conscientious fidelity
to the judicial oath (to support this Constitution) and the usual human foible
of imagining one's philosophy to possess a superiority sufficient to entitle one
to substitute it by fiat.
But, equally, at p. 27, you are seriously in error in suggesting a similarity of
my views with those of Raoul Berger; his habit is (a) to prefer a rule of narrow
construction, (b) to impute a narrow parochialism to those who were chiefly
responsible for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the fourteenth
amendment, (c) to subordinate express clauses to unexpressed exceptions, and
(d) to read "history" as meanmindedly as the narrowest partisan culling of the
debates may lend itself to--none of which and no single part of which strikes
me as sound.
As to the suggestion that the criticism is merely that the Court's
"methodology" is wrong (p. 27, fotnote 53), I think, rather, that: (a) there is no
consistent methodology, rather, it is too frequently the case that the
methodology is whatever serves preselected outcomes (in brief, a number of
men who have served on the Supreme Court do in fact "lie" even about their
methodology as well as what they purport to do), and (b), despite the poetic
grace of your concluding potpurri of suggestions, I find no methodology either
proposed or defended. Indeed, I cannot make out any "methodology" at all.
Looking back over this letter, it reads much more harshly than I intended,
for which I apologize. Still, I think it incumbent on you to try to do two things;
first, deal with the enclosed manuscript, especially part IV and the illustrative
footnotes. Second, "come clean" with a defense of whatever alternative way of
doing constitutional law you personally and professionally find suitable to
embrace. In footnote 45 of the enclosed manuscript, I suggest three rival
metaphors for the constitution: proteus, the dead sea scrolls, and redwood
trees (with amendments as cambium rings). Which of these comes closest to
762
your own mark? Which do you professionally elect to identify with, and why?
And, of course, if these three seem to you to be unfair, i.e., to leave a fourth and
better one out of account, what is it? How would you describe it? What would
you think to be your own obligation if you were placed on the Supreme Court?
Again, my sincere thanks for sending your provocative article. I hope our
exchange of correspondence will be useful.
Best personal regards,
William Van Alstyne
June 1, 1987
Professor William Van Alstyne
Duke University
School of Law
Durham, NC 27706
Dear Professor Van Alstyne:
Thank you for your letter of May 18th. I do not find it harsh at all, so there
is no need to apologize.
Thank you also for the two manuscripts and the reprint. I read them with
much interest.
When the galley proofs of my article return from the printer next month, I
will add a final footnote calling the reader's attention to your Iowa and AALS
articles. But I think that it will not be possible at this time for me to reformulate
my article to take into account your Iowa article as you suggest in your letter.
As for your suggestion that I "come clean" with a constitutional theory of
my own or to embrace someone else's, I will certainly keep it in mind as a long-
term project for the future. I just do not think that in view of the original
purpose and scope of my modest article, it is necessary for me to do so at this
time.
I should add that I have no serious quarrel -with your "rebuttable
presumption of generous contruction" of all constitutional clauses. But I am
not convinced that it will prove to be very helpful in determiningjust what is it
that the Constitution permits, prohibits or commands in any given case. In
particular, I find very little explanation in your Iowa article as to how the
presumption may in fact be rebutted. Your reference to "evidence of limited
intended proper use" of a constitutional clause (p. 32) seems to me to take us
back to square one: the "proper" sources of constitutional interpretation and
how does one ascertain them.
Once again thank you for your letter and articles. Our exchange of views
indeed has been very useful to me.
Cordially,
Jos6 Julidin Alvarez-Gonzdlez

